There are n neighboring cells in a straight line. A man hides among one of all cells and stays there. The searcher examines each cell until he finds the hider. Associated with the examination by the searcher are a traveling cost dependent on the distance from the last cell examined and a fixed examination cost. The searcher wishes to minimize the expectation of cost of finding the hider. On the other hand the hider wishes to maximize it. This is formulated as a two-person zero-sum game and it is solved.
1.
Introduction.
Gluss [4] analyzed a model in which there are n + 1 neighboring cells in a straight line, labeled from 0 to n in that order. An object is in one of them except for Cell 0 with a priori probabilities PI, . . . ,Pn' At the beginning of the search the searcher is at Cell 0 that is next to Cell 1.
It is required to determine a strategy that will minimize the statistical expectation of the cost of finding the object.
Associated with the examination of each cell is the examination cost.
The only difference between his model and the previous one (See [1] ) is that while that cost is constant in the latter, it varies through time, that is, a traveling cost is added in the former (See [4] ). Gluss treated two cases: PI ~ ... ~ Pn and PI ~ ... ~ Pn. He showed that the former case is trivial, the searcher should examine each cell in the order of 1, 2, . . . ,n, and in the latter case he found approximately optimal search strategies when Pi is proportional to i. These strategies are written by one parameter.
While Gluss treats a one decision-maker problem, in this note we assume a hider with his will instead of the object and take the game theoretical point of view. Thus. there are a hider and a searcher. While the searcher wishes to minimize the cost of finding the hider. the hider chooses a cell so as to maximize it. We have a two-person zero-sum game.
For example. this new model can be regarded as a description of a military situation.
Alternatively we can imagine a one decision-maker problem in which he has no information on the probability of existence. The decision-maker may usually assume the uniform distribution.
However, assume he is very pessimistic or conservative. Then he may imagine a game theoretical situation.
The unique optimal strategy for the hider obtained in this note can be compared with that in Gluss [4] given as an a priori probability. The latter is proportional and the former is hyperbolic.
Another variant of the model of Gluss IS m Kikuta [5] , where the searcher is at the cell that locates at the center of all cells at the beginning of the search. But, it is, still, a one decision-maker problem. [6] and [71 are surveys on the search theory.
In the next section our model is stated in detail. Most part of Section 3 is spent for solving the game. In Section 4 some remarks are given.
2. The Model and Notation.
There are n + 1 neighboring cells in a straight line, labeled from 0 to n m that order. Player I (the hider) hides among one of all cells except for Cell 0, and stays there. Player 2 (the searcher) exammes each cell until he finds Player 1. There is not a probability of overlooking Player I given that the right cell is searched. It is assumed that at the beginning of the search Player 2 is at Cell O. Before searching (hiding) Player 2 (Player 1) must determine a strategy so as to make the cost of finding Player 1 as small (large) as possible.
A (pure) strategy for Player I is to choose an element, say i, of N .. {I ,2, . . . ,n}, which means he determines on hiding in Cell i. This is denoted by i (i EN). The set of all strategies for Player I is denoted by N '" {l.2, . . . ,n}. A strategy for Player 2 is defined by a permutation on N. The set of all permutations on N is denoted by M '" {l,2, . . . ,m}, where m = n!. Thus under a strategy 1, Player 2 examines Cells 1(\), 1(2), ... , i(n) in this order. In particular, 1 expresses the identity and m expresses the permutation such that m(i) = n-i+ I for i = I, ... ,no For a strategy pair (1,1) (i E N, j E M), let k = j-l(i). Then the cost of finding Player I, written as f(i,j) , is : The purpose of this section is to give optimal strategies and examine their Further we have (ii) since b < 1. Let's see (i). When n = I, (i) is true by (3.1). Assume n ~ 2 and (i) is true for I, ... ,n-1. n n n n n
By (3.1), we have.
By the induction hypothesis,
Jll reverses the order of examination under j. Thus, if j is expressed as an n-vector, that is. j = [l(1),j (2) •... ,j(n)]. then Jll = [l(n) •... ,jO)]. We can assume j is as follows:
Thus, j has k peaks and we say j is a k-peaked strategy. In particular. we set j(n+ 1 14. . Yn 1 c Further, Itmn __ +oo~= I-b= 1+2" Theorem I only gives optimal strategies for player 2, and it says nothing about the set of all optimal strategies for Player 2. Suppose n = 3. Suppose 1 and 2 are strategies such that 1(1) = 1, 1(2) = 2, 1(3) == 3, 2(1) == 1, 2(2) == 3, and 2(3) == 2. All optimal strategies for Player 2 are mixed strategies such that the searcher chooses q(l) and q(2.) with probabilities t and I-t respectively for all t with 0 ~ t ~ I. .: start 0: goal
We see that f(i, i) + f(i, Qj) = 2(5 + 3c) for i = 1,2,3,4,5. By (3.1), f(pS, i) == 5 + 3c. Indeed the value of the game is vs = 5 + 3c. Before proving the theorem we need some lemmas.
Lemma l. For any I-peaked strategy j E M, f(p,q(j» = V n . for any strategy pEP. 
The second term becomes
h=l h h=O t=ih+l h=l h by Proposition l(i). Hence f(pn,j) -Vn becomes :
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+ p n j(i2+S) {j(iIl+U(i2+s)-j(il)I+(i]+r+l)c} + .f Pj~t) {j(i])+U(t)-j(i])1 + (t+l)c} t=11 +r+ I
i->+s-l On the other hand, seeing that f is I-peaked, Hence, i3 n i3+S n f(pn,f) == ... + ~ Pj(t){i(t) + (t-u)c} + ~ Pj(t){2n -j(t) + (t-u)c} t=12+1 t=13+1 u i3+S+kl+ ... +kr n + r. r.
r=1 t=i]+S+kl+ ... +kr_I+\ r=1
'" A + Bc , where 
Remarks. (i)
It is interesting to compare the optimal strategy pn for Player 1 with the probability distribution given as a prior distribution in Gluss [4] . Write it as pH. That Let S* '" {r* : 1 ~ r ~ nl and S# '" {u# : 0 ~ u ~ n-l}. We see that r* reverses the order of (r-I )#. S * and S# are just sets of I-peaked strategies. Gluss dealt with the minimization problem : Minimize f(p#,D subject to j: E S* U S#. If a one decisionmaker problem is uncertain (that is, not risky) the decision-maker may assume the uniform distribution. Thus, let pU be the uniform distribution on N. Then Vn ~ Min{f(pU.i') : 1 E M} = f(pu,l) = (n+l)(1+c)/2, where 1 corresponds to the identity pennutation. In the following figure f(pu,l). v n , and the minimum of f(p#,i') are compared. o 14 3
Fi~ure 11. v f(pu·U Gluss (ii) It is interesting to consider a continuous version of the model dealt with in this note, in which the interval of [0,1] is given instead of the n-cells. Player I chooses one point in it and hides an object there. We must define strategies for Player 2 suitably before beginning the analysis (see [21 or [3] ), Instead of pusueing that model, we give here a remark on the behavior of pn when n the number of cells becomes large, The resulting probability distribution may make clear characteristics of pn, where 
